More Posts

And I'm totally Convinced about the Fact the Best way I can use this place is by cold mind, Sharing Thoughts from time to time. Not into the romantic (if she had ever wanted some human honest touch she woud have done something, she had 9 years for this); but into the Society.
today no sharings as I said, because very Focused, not only because not in the best mood, but because it's Important.
Well, I think I did share enough!
Loving! Yes, because the Thoughts can only be Well Taken if there's Love

Hi!


How are things!
As I said, coming once or twice a week.
I'll be doing the same when starting the normal working time.
More than for justice (I Believe in Justice!, I'm not the maker of it, but I Believe in it, coherently to all I've TRIED to explain for last years), for the Need I've got for finishing my written essay.
Today I've gone to a place where they're impressing books and magazines. A first contact, I'll be told the approximated prices for my particular impressing. Of course, I'll bring it to the official register of intellectual property too.
It's just that I am not ready to be erasing many things from my definitive version. In the case the University (I'm expecting nothing about it) may want to publish on these conditions (as a non perfect and perfectly editable essay, but not as something to be re-made of new against the author), I'll do by it. If not, on my own.
Anyway, the official degree of doctor I want to achieve. More than anything, for working chances.
I'd like something on Ramon Llull. Really. I've been thinking about it.
Have to say that this Book I'm reading from this Collection of Philosophy, Miguel García-Baró Author, on Husserl and Gadamer, it's One of the Best I've found in this series.
One of the ideas I've liked very much is that the passion and true efforts for the Truth, about "the totality" and into the deepest possible, truly comes from the very intense love for the others. It's something very good.
Well, and also Wanted to Send Very Big Good Hug to René Angélil and his Wife, and to All the People who may be in simmilar situations. God Bless You!


And Very Nice Videos and Pictures today, have to say too, wow!
Also, Very Good Big Loving Endless Hug for Brooke; keep in touch, Loving Forever!!


ps: see on next week! I'm resting, going to the sea, trying to relax, and also reading and taking a look to all I've been lately writing, for starting the 7th chapter very coherently to all I've said before.
See later, God Bless!

Hi!


How are things.
In fact, in only ontologic ways, Bergson tries to explain what I try by ontoepistemologic terms (ontology, the things and the being as they are; epistemology, the study of our cognitivity).
He talks about "duración" as opposed to physical "time".  Only in the living there's the difference (homo faber, sapiens), while in the physical there's only a continued following of identities, where there's no difference (I'd add for explaining this: E=mcxc: there is a creation understanding and explaining by human; and there is the identity), and we could use the example of the arc and the arrow all along the movement of it through space.
Zenon, who used first this, was talking about cognition and its immanent metaphysics for understanding the move and the change.
But Bergson makes all ontologic (like Heidegger), forgetting the constitution of our minds.
There're changes in physical space.  And I can prove it better than by any other argument from the appearance of facts before our senses and by a derived argument from this which is purely metaphysical, paradox: if universe gets expanded, throughout what kind of thing is getting expanded, if there's only universe...
In fact, he was deffending the difference between human consciousness and conscience (morals, creativity...) and positive caption of things.
Obviously, talking the most abstract possible terms upon metaphysics, the creativity is a qualitatively different character to the universal being.
But for this, he should have taken more directly the way of the epistemology (he was back and forth between logicism and Zenon for life, for what I know, this is the problem), as much as the ontology.
And it can all be fundamented on the "feeling of knowing", and the Sense connected to this, in the "total or complete reason" (talking about logic-causalistic explanation and the Sense, this mean a double coherent interaction between conscience and nature; first, the structures of reality around and the logic rules of causality which are printed in the structure of our thinking; second, the Sense as a biologic found for and because of the conscient cognition -duplicity of semantics is OK for explaining this clear).
The problem for understanding the movement, going a little further on this global argumentation, is not laying on the fact we can not imagine it (we can!).  The explanation has to go deeper in the epistemologic structures of our knowing.  It has to get to explain the conceptuality, transcendent one, and how it works.
Bergson (all this is from yesterday reading at night and sense appeared in my mind, by intellectualized empathy on sense from he was meaning) says it could be all, the reality, the same without time, to us.  Because we know this way, like out of time (logics, OK; but causality is something to explain, "a la Kant" by "core consciousness" of Damasio, from our cognitive system); but it seems he's saying something different at sometime (obviously, causality on time is there, and this is well ontologic, and influencing the human creativity too -on this Heidegger was more balanced; Bergson talks about evolutionist metaphysics, but he does not connect well enough conscience and nature -I did, or started, this actual way from the fist time, even before reading Damasio, only From Darwin, as Bergson).
But there's a contradiction here.  Knowing out of time (making the knowing), but creating on time...
All the problem lays in the lack of explanation, in terms of epistemic structures, upon conceptuality and its relationship to logic causality.
I can not figure totally out what he says about the Einstein's time, but I think he will say it's all less or more similar addition of ontologically identic times, whatever the number of them maybe (as many as inertial observers, we could add).  Something that, from his theory, does mean essential undifference in reality without human.
He Wants to Preserve the Human Spirit before material constitution of the reality.  Great!  The problem is that he does not explain well enough what kind of unmaterial constitution can or may we be talking about, for making the difference, more than as a different nature by itself as he says, as something different to the pure material not able to get reduced to purely positivist explanations.  The answer gets all out by the better was structured and explained logic opposition between these two concepts, and not by an ontologic difference, but by an ontoepistemologic one.
The petitum principi is always there, anyway, for positivists and for those focused only in the ontology (Heidegger does only understand at the end, going to poetry, but even he does not totally understand, and, of course, does not dare to try to explain, because he does not know how to do it and because it's too contradictory to his teoric fundaments).  In these last ones too because they're using the reason, pretending not making objectivity but using the mind the same way as the first ones, by the cartesian reason, incomplete.
Anyway, it's a little Heidegger is so Famous, Books Wherever, and Bergson, Nobel Literature (he could not be silly! ), it's almost lost.  Is it because the first is focused in the "Willing", "voluntad", and Bergson only in the "duration", something not so different from the common concept of freedom; or maybe because the first Heidegger is such a statu quo conservative one, on his "Dasein", better said.
Or... I don't know, in fact.   Anyway, I can not understand this result, because Heidegger is not positivist for ontology, but he was for politics.  Though, after war, why still there?  Probably for a matter of fashionism.  he was focused in the language, instead of the universe and time.  And on their time, the first one was the Fashionist, and the second the too old and overreached question.  Yes, I guess.  So, normal.  Sorry, I had to know


Big Very Good Loving hug of Love, Eternal and Transcending almost itself!!

That video on height ( )...
I know husband is 1'82, and you're a little shorter with no heels, so...
My hate can not be that much!


ps: ballerinas is my win!


psII: Good job! Good hug! Friendly!

Second post here, this is very important.
it's how It seemed to be in "Leap of Faith" from the distance. You did even have some little cute problem for situation that very noble part of anatomy on the "alféizar" of a window. I Remember. And I always thought it was intentioned for some
Hugs!

About last post. This way we do also see how I am introducing the reasons (the misteries there're in the reason from the traditional perspective) for the anthropologic study, first evolution theory and after neuroscience.

Text edited, if we do, we do it well  
"23/10/2015
La “reconstrucción” lógica (recordando el término “reconstruccionismo” con que a menudo se identifica a filósofos analíticos como Bertrand Russell, por ejemplo) y la transcendencia no son términos incompatibles, al contrario. Por medio de los mecanismos psicológicos correspondientes (interés en una materia o asunto, conocimientos, operaciones de abstracción y transcendencia cognitiva previas, experiencias, recuerdos, situaciones envolventes, evocaciones…), se crea en la mente un determinado nivel de transcendencia en que se sitúan un conjunto de elementos (los anteriores; si bien, en la continuidad cerebral consciente-subconsciente es imposible determinar con exactitud qué está influyendo en cada situación) junto a las leyes formales de la deducción. Y se opera con ellos, en forma de ilación lógica (en red, no en términos de lógica proposicional clásica).
En tanto que la deducción supone siempre una tautología, tratar de pensar si primero fue la intuición mental (“apophansis”, en términos clásicos) sobre la conclusión (la famosa “abducción” de Pierce, o la “magia” de Einstein) o la aplicación de las leyes deductivas es como preguntarse por la vieja cuestión de la gallina y el huevo. Ambas esferas interactúan en el plano transcendente-simbólico de las imágenes conceptuales, hasta dar con la conclusión definitiva, o no, que es un nuevo concepto complejo, situado en un nivel superior de transcendencia cognitiva (mayor y más profundo conocimiento) y que en el momento de suceder se identifica con lo que ya he explicado que es el Sentido cognoscitivo, en el ámbito de cada mente (el cual se objetiva por medio de la interacción simbólica sobre las bases materiales del lenguaje semiótico, que permite proyectar la justificación argumentativa del sentido frente a otras mentes). Ésta es la clave fundamental de la mente cognoscitiva funcional.
Las leyes lógicas, para Wittgenstein, constituyen con certeza un nivel metafísico, inalcanzable para la razón objetiva (pues ésta se desarrolla sobre las estructuras lógicas, como parte estructural de sí misma, lo cual, como expliqué respecto de la autoconsciencia, supone la imposibilidad de objetivación lógica-causal de dichas leyes), hasta el punto de atreverse a afirmar el fin de la filosofía, pues “de lo que no se puede hablar, hay que callar”. Esto, como he demostrado en estos últimos 3 años, no es así. Es más, es preciso notar que para poder tratar toda la información previa a la formación de nuevos conceptos, toda ella se sitúa, gracias al papel “funcionalmente” metafísico del simbolismo de nuestra mente, conceptualizada y simbolizada, en el mismo nivel transcendente que las leyes lógicas de que habla Wittgenstein (creo que habría que diferenciar, en su rol funcional –recordemos lo ya comentado sobre la diferencia ontoepistemológica entre principio de identidad y principio de causalidad, para el progreso del conocimiento- entre el principio genérico de la deducción, “=>”, y los principios lógicos clásicos de la lógica aristotélica, los cuales constituyen, a su vez, la base cierta de la más moderna lógica formal). Y no hay problema para seguir adelante con el estudio de todo ello, sin complejos. Creo que éste es un gran paso de mi filosofía para aclarar muchos problemas.
En mi ensayo trataré los orígenes evolutivos del simbolismo conceptual de nuestra mente, y lo relacionaré con las cuestiones de la lógica y la matemática, y la ontoepistemología general. Contrariamente a lo que decía Russell al principio de su carrera, la ciencia matemática no es exactamente igual a la lógica, puesto que la primera refleja un statu quo final del ser (nociones ya comentadas de “verdadero” e identidad), pero no la esencia metafísica de la deducción, el famoso “=>”, sobre todo; la cual, de hecho, se aplica en cada momento operacional de aquélla del mismo modo que sucede en la operatividad de cualquier otro lenguaje simbólico menos abstracto. La lógica también es metafísica respecto de las matemáticas. Por eso, seguramente, Wittgenstein decía que el matemático es un inventor, no un descubridor. Creo que comparto esta opinión, más o menos implícitamente en mi mente, desde hace unos 10 años, cuando leí un texto sobre la naturaleza ontológica de las matemáticas, en el cual se recoge un debate entre dos eminentes pensadores, un biólogo y un matemático".