Hi Good hug!!
How are things!
Yesterday I did read more than 73 pages from the Book. Finishing on monday as i said. Impatient for start Wittgenstein. After it, only total finish of Damasio's (some pages to re-read in the end), I Book from Aristotile's Metaphysics... and start to re-read key texts I wrote and some specific I marked from some authors.
Russell talks so much about induction problem, making a probabilistic problem of it, in the beginning only because at last he admits this needs something more, an extralogic fundament (it's not he said the opposite in the beginning, but there he seems to have some wills for finding out something more definitive, logic terms, than he can do finally). Admits, qualitative terms, even after so many mathematic digressions on probability theory that he shares; things are not much different as when Hume pushed the key button on it.
Which inferences are able to be called as probable, more probable, less probable, only very little believable or credible... It's very complicated.
Russell asks if it could be possible to argue for a fundamental principle for explaining the whole functionality of induction for prediction of nature causality.
From the moment he fixes the empirist principle that there's a fixed departuring from all knowledge, the data (from senses, printed in mind from translation from inputs from nature), that somehow he calls objective, he obviously holds that position towards induction. He explicit terms rejects the coherentism from Hegel or John Dewey.
But, in fact, the induction functionality needs a very complex answer, putting together his fundationalism, properly explained, and the coherentism. It can not be determined as a simple principle. Not at all, sorry me. We want all simplicity possible, but there're thing that are not simple at all (following Ockham, he says the simple answer is always -or almost- the best choice for scientist explanation, though he admits also it's possible things get a little more complicated, when getting more into the situation and hyphotesis).
Somehow, he admits this need for coherence. But, curiously, and this is a very weak point from the Big Book of him, he only does for science and the dealing with the scientistic laws and data, for getting some certainty.
he says epistemologic propositions are different to logic, as long it's not possible to prove they are false...well What a mess, and that they are the fundament for the cognitive building of the rest of "propositionable" knowledge.
Here we have some mess. obvious to see.
the only thing that I think it's not so obvious on it is the fact epistemologic is not away from logic, even also for what's related to its first fundament of all. Here's his main mistake.
The "logic digression" (concept of my own -yes, me, me, me...
but well, this is for getting good places for the better of all, so, I have to go
less or more naturally) is key for understanding this last point.
The problem is that cartesian "cogito, ergo sum" it's not a logic fundament. And from this, all thinkers coming after him, induced by Descartes mistake (All thinkers, even the brightest as Russell or Descartes, do make mistakes), or almost all, after seeing the nature of the mistake (the same it's happening with the evident self-failing of the "ontologic argument"), thought anything as fundament of all can be said.
But Damasio, on a line started by Darwin, Help us see this is not necessarily True. And well, after all, Classic Thinkers from Greece Did "something" too for this, before the too huge cartesian separation: mainly, in this context, expressable as the supression of all aristotelic causes excepting the third one. Because this is good for scientist methode, but not good for the "total" thinking; the place where Russell, even though all the Magnificient logic and mathematic reasoning exposed, is effectively playing around.
The key is the supression of all knowledge that can not be fixed as pure objectivity. This is always something "alter", "not-self", in cartesian terminology. But what happens with the self, who is the origen and the box containing all that's thought and said. Some structural weight this has to have, to whats related to the whole cognitive system and its fundaments.
And if we have to study this structural weight (it's not only the senses, as Russell or Kant say, the elements conditioning what we can or what we do know), we have to do non objectivistic terms, because this is impossible.
But, going back to Aristotile and the Classic, this non modern objectivity does not mean we can not talk on the road of logic, properly shoed with deep enough understanding of how to drive it (my "logic digression" represents my effort for this, and the first step is the same problem of objectivity impossible to what's related to our conscience, in terms of ordinary and usual scientistic knowledge; I mean, we can say these neurones, and these nerves, and these parts..., but we can not say the same essence of it, and we can not perceive it, at the very least the way we perceive, symbolically, the essence of what can be called as a book, by instance -though, in this case too, we're entering in some different version of the innate metaphysic problem, which is not that much in fact because it's the functional key for our cognitive progress, and this is a success I have to share that I see in my theory; and this last problem is what Wittgenstein is talking about, and it's a "sub-problem", truly relationed to the main structural one I am commenting about the first fundaments of epistemology: if we work out our mind by symbols, it's impossible to "capture" them as an orange inside of a box, obvious).
Director told me yesterday that I'm improving very well, and today told me (yes, I am a truly real nightmare for everybody near to me
) he does believe I'm bringing differencial understanding upon these things. And though he insisted, wisely, in methodology I have to follow for clearity, he said I have to do free what I feel the most natural: if want to end essay before doctorating, then do it, if not...
I do bring a pulsion too strong for leaving the essay now. I have to Finish it Well. Much Work. But so Much Joy (beyond ego, True -this counts, if not I'd not be human, but the "childish" part, and also the social helping part too, do count more).
Big Hug Loving Beautiful, Most Delicate Expressivity on the Most Beautiful Face You Really are to me!
Many Greetings and Best Peaceful Wishes True!
Coming later at night for Friendly good night hug!!
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Subject: Re: My Brooke Songs!! 
Fri Nov 20, 2015 4:15 pm
Human normal; though highest iq as qualitative results ever possible me 
).
